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theory of language on the body, locates the foundation of referentiality in the 
body, the destructive capacities of modern war can sever any links between the 
body and language, and make the latter appear quite non-referential. The use 
of euphemisms contributes significantly to this undermining oflanguage" (178). 
Comer convincingly concludes that Owen exposes the hypocrisy of euphemism, 
while Whitman deploys euphemism on occasion, in "what becomes a prevail-
ing linguistic practice, especially with regard to warfare and weapons" (181), 
namely falsity in the guise of nationalist patriotism. 
St. John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota LUKE MANcuso 
RICHARD RORTY. Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century 
America. The William E. Massey Sr. Lectures in the History of American 
Civilization. Harvard University Press, 1997. 
It is hard not to sympathize with the main contention of these lectures, namely, 
that Leftist thought in America has adopted a "spirit of detached spectatorship" 
(11) and devoted itself to theorizing society rather than reforming it. The Old 
Left of Eugene V. Debs, Upton Sinclair, and Herbert Croly operated on "the 
conviction that the vast inequalities within American society could be corrected 
by using the institutions of a constitutional democracy-that a cooperative com-
monwealth could be created by electing the right politicians and passing the 
right laws" (54-55). But New, Cultural LeftiSts like Fredric Jameson eschew 
that activism and instead ponder indefinite politico-cultural conditions like "late 
capitalism" and ruminate upon hazy abstractions like "objectivity." Old Left-
ists sought to effect a just redistribution of wealth and opportunity. New Left-
ists "specialize in what they call the 'politics of difference' or 'of identity' or 'of 
recognition'" (76-77). Old Leftists worry about minimum wages, adequate 
housing, and universal health care. New Leftists worry about how to "teach 
Americans to recognize otherness" (79). 
For Rorty, what separates the activist Old Left from the spectatorial New 
Left is a historical event-Vietnam. Once the dirty facts of U.S. intervention 
emerged and complicity seemed ubiquitous, Leftist thought lost faith in the 
viability of changing American policy by constitutional means. The goal was 
no longer "achieving our country"-that is, bringing American politics in line 
with democratic ideals such as those Whitman and Dewey espouse-but ex-
posing the System. Old-style reformist strategies (mobilizing voting blocs, ap-
pealing to unions, muckraking) were too easily coopted by the Establishment, 
absorbed into the hegemony and muffled. Once that skepticism set in, Rorty 
says/ the Political Left was eclipsed by a Cultural Left, a largely academic crowd 
cynical about America, disengaged from practice, and producing ever-more-
abstract, jargon-ridden interpretations of cultural phenomena. 
Again, it is not difficult to appreciate Rorty's profile of today's Leftist cul-
tural critic. The self-styled tenured radical delivering a lecture on, say, the Yale 
graduate student strike before catching a plane for the next stop on the confer-
ence tour is an all-too-familiar sight. The second-year grad student itching to 
get into the composition classroom and impart Foucauldian insights about power 
and institutions, but who has little interest in diction and syntax, exemplifies a 
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widespread confusion over the aims ofEnglisb education. Set alongside Rorty's 
model intellectual Eugene Debs, such intramural Leftists appear downright 
flatulent. Debs mounted an exciting presidential campaign in 1912, and later 
served time in the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta for violating Wilson's 1917 
Espionage Act (later the statutory basis for the House Un-American Activities 
Committee and the McCarthy Hearings). He fomented labor reforms and pro-
tested imperialist foreign policy, and suffered for it. But what constitutes aca-
demic Leftist activity? Not countering the propaganda and politicking of the 
Religious Right. Not investigating corporate lobbying tactics. Not going door-
to-door with petitions. Rather, it entails revising syllabi to include more diver-
sity, writing articles deconstructing the bourgeois subject in the Victorian novel, 
or serving on affirmative action committees-and profiting by it. Those actions 
all have merit, and may indeed have a seepage effect, as they alter students' 
thinking, revise the canon, and support Leftist social agendas. But the effect is 
politically radical only in a weak sense and should not be equated with the 
activities of Debs or of Capitol Hill lobbyists. 
Of course, Rorty's portrait of the academic Left and its pseudopolitics rests 
upon a definition of politics that few academic Leftists would accept. For the 
latter, politics refers to the sum of human relations, period. Any interaction is 
political-a predication flexible and vague enough to allow academics to con-
sider themselves agents of political change whenever they attend a conference 
or grade a student paper. But for Rorty (and most politicians and political 
scientists), politics signifies more specifically "the allocation and distribution 
of resources by governing bodies." Only those things that directly influence 
groups' access to resources counts as political. A law, a housing policy, a tax 
loophole, admissions standards-all affect the price and availability of certain 
goods and services, so any action or discourse influencing them is political. 
And, Rorty adds, for those actions and discourses to qualify as genuinely politi-
cal, they must have a "real" bearing upon practical affairs. For example, 
Baudrillard's theoretical survey of America as Disneyland writ large may be 
curious and stimulating, but it is not political. For a nation-interpretation to be 
political, it must "start by proposing changes in the laws of a real country, 
inhabited by real people who are enduring. unnecessary suffering, much of which 
can be cured by governmental action" (99). But such concrete revisions have 
little appeal to the Cultural Left, whose members prefer to act as cultural in-
quisitors, not political agitators. "The Foucauldian academic Left" is "a Left 
whose members are so busy unmasking the present that they have no time to 
discuss what laws need to be passed in order to create a better future" (139). 
Rorty's call for a return to Old Left activism is a satisfying antidote to the 
pretensions of the Cultural Left and its self-justifying expansion of the mean-
ing of politics. But while Rorty's general point entices scholars weary of the 
radical claims of their colleagues, as soon as Rorty begins to detail his theme, 
the satisfaction quickly departs. To back his contentions about the academic 
Left, Rorty provides various observations on the contemporary scene, includ-
ing personal anecdotes (56-64), confessions of ignorance (128), and 
neopragmatic epigrams (27). But the observations amount less to a series of 
informal pieces of argument than they do to an odd list of misrepresentations, 
overstatements, and speculations. And added to their incorrectness is Rorty's 
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annoying habit of tossing off these summary judgments with dispatch and surety, 
as if they were palpably indisputable. 
How true, measured, and informed are the following statements: 
(1) "But if [Vietnam protesters'] patience had not run out at some point, if 
they had never taken to the streets, if civil disobedience had never replaced an 
insistence on working within the system, America might no longer be a consti-
tutional democracy" (69). 
(2) "The principal motive behind the new directions taken in scholarship in 
the United States since the Sixties has been the urge to do something for people 
who have been humiliated ... " (SO). 
(3) "All universities worthy of the name have always been centers of social 
protest" (S2). 
(4) "One reason the cultural Left will have a hard time transforming itself 
into a political Left is that, like the Sixties Left, it still dreams of being rescued 
by an angelic power called 'the people'" (102). 
(5) "When literature replaces the Bible, polytheism and its problems return 
... " (117). 
(6) "By 'Platonism' I mean the idea that great works of literature all, in the 
end, say the same thing-and are great precisely because they do so" (135). 
(7) "Whitman would have been delighted by rock-and-roll, drugs, and the 
kind of casual, friendly copulation that is insouciant about the homosexual-
heterosexual distinction" (26). 
The first sentence is a bizarre piece of alarmist historiography. Rorty says 
that without the protest movement the American system of government might 
have collapsed. But how did protesters save "constitutional democracy"? They 
objected to a vile foreign policy, not un-constitutional forces. When was con-
stitutional democracy endangered? 
The second statement, pinpointing an aid-the-humiliated motive behind all 
innovative post-Sixties scholarship, is obviously overstated. While the motive 
may lie behind feminist scholarship, African-American studies, and the like, it 
does not belong to deconstruction, psychoanalysis, or Rorty's own neo-
pragmatism. Why make such sweeping summations? Why attach all "new di-
rections" in scholarship to a single motive? 
The third statement, I presume, does not require comment. 
The fourth statement asserts that a populist dream underlies the Cultural 
Left's vision. But few Leftist critics in the Humanities believe in the people's 
capacity to recognize their own salvation. Much Cultural Leftist thought (de-
rived from Foucault, Althusser, or Baudrillard) automatically assumes the false 
consciousness, ideological blindness, and willing subjection of the people to 
disciplinary practices, discursive formations, and capitalism. Besides, anybody 
attending the MIA convention or reading the impenetrable prose of cultural 
studies theorists knows that the academic Left harbors just as many elitist atti-
tudes as the academic Right. 
One cannot evaluate the fifth statement because its meaning is so obscure. 
(Polytheism?!) 
The sixth statement is a typical Rorty broadside. A complex, loaded term-
"Platonism"-receives a new definition, a pithy, useful, and wholly reductive 
reference designed only to convert opponents into straw men. Its spuriousness 
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becomes clear as soon as one asks whether anybody would accept this state-
ment as a characterization of him- or herself. Does anybody working in the 
academy today believe that all great literature says the same thing, and that this 
is the basis of its greamess? 
Finally, the last sentence on Whitman's speculated delight in sex, drugs, and 
rock-and-roll-this is an embarrassing misunderstanding of Whitman's atti-
tudes. First of all, on rock-and-roll: Whitman might have tolerated rock music 
as a libidinal expression, but Whitman's favorite music was Italian opera. Given 
Whitman's emphasis on the spiritual power of great voices like Elias Hicks's, 
Whitman likely would have considered rock music an inferior form of "vocal-
ization." On drugs: Whitman endorsed visionary states of consciousness, but 
he also embraced a purist philosophy of the body. He prefers the inebriation of 
the open air, not of alcohol and opium. His portraits of drunkards are sympa-
thetic, but not celebratory. (We won't mention his temperance novel.) On ca-
sual, friendly, hetero- and homosexual copulation: Whitman never advocated 
casual sex. His puritanism prevented that. Whitman did advocate a polymor-
phous perversity and sexual pleasure, but he delighted in coupling only when it 
led to a heightened, non-casual experience. 
This is not a one-time misconstrual of Whitman. Rorty is so intent on push-
ing his vision of a secular liberal democracy that he represents Whitman as his 
own precursor, as a nineteenth-century neopragmatist determined to remove 
God, sin, and elitism from American society. Whitman says, "And I call to 
mankind, Be not curious about God," which to Rorty means: "Whitman thought 
there was no need to be curious about God because there is no standard, not 
even a divine one, against which the decisions of a free ' people can be mea-
sured" (16). That is, people should avoid curiosity not because it hinders their 
receptivity to God's inspiration (as careful readers of Whitman would con-
clude), but because there is nothing to be curious about, no standard to ex-
plore beyond the projections of a "free people." 
A few pages later, Rorty amplifies Whitman's supposed secularism by inter-
preting Whitman's "America is the greatest poem" sentiment as: "We are the 
greatest poem because we put ourselves in the place of God" (22). But where 
in Whitman's entire corpus does the poet say that Americans stand in the place 
of God? Rorty's inference sounds more like Milton's Satan than Whitman's 
Americans, which prominently include pietistic figures like Quaker women and 
his own mother. True, Whitman often claims divinity for himself and others, 
but the claim implies direct participation with and in God, not displacement of 
God. 
Other misrepresentations of Whitman include the overblown treatment of 
Whitman as a "reader of Hegel" (19-22) and the false assertion that Whitman 
denied the "eternal and nonhuman" (17) a place in human affairs. I suspect 
that the same questions of misrepresentation apply to Rorty's characterization 
of Dewey, and of the Old and New Left. But perhaps accusations of inaccuracy 
do not pertain to this text, written by a philosopher who has consistently de-
nounced a correspondence theory of truth. At the end of Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature, Rorty argued for a fundamental alteration in philosophical 
inquiry, namely, a substitution of edification for epistemology. With its con-
cerns with truth, epistemic justification, and evidence, Rorty says, epistemol-
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ogy remains committed to the search for eternal, nonhuman grounds for knowl-
edge. With that metaphysical hope exploded by Dewey, Wittgenstein, and 
Heidegger (Rorty's antimetaphysical triumvirate), knowledge has become an 
outgrowth of persuasion and convention, in open societies a conversational 
process of edification. Truth, then, is not the correspondence of statement and 
state of affairs, but rather those opinions that survive all conversational objec-
tions. Hence Rorty's breezy style, provocative locutions, expeditious judgments, 
his general carelessness of getting things right. 
So, one might say, we should assess Achieving Our Country as polemic, not 
description. Rorty's explanation of nation-stories-"Stories about what a na-
tion has been and should try to be are not attempts at accurate representation, 
but rather attempts to forge a moral identity" (13)-rightly apply to his own 
assertions. But this rationale will not do. Rorty bases his critique of the New 
Left on profiles of Old and New Leftists and on a mini-history of the transition 
from Old to New. The corrective he prescribes derives from Whitman's vision 
of an American future. The method begs the question of whether the profiles, 
the history, and the corrective ,are faithful to their original. And here, appraisals 
of fidelity need not be metaphysically founded, but only logically founded, that 
is, on a basic incompatibility of Rorty's descriptions and the objects of those 
descriptions. 
In Whitman's case, Rorty's statements are obviously incompatible with 
Whitman's own statements. A deliberate reading of Whitman's corpus quickly 
shows that Rorty's interpretation (particularly of Whitman's secularism) has 
little warrant. In sympathy with Rorty's general point about the pretensions 
and ps.eudopolitics of academic Leftists, one wishes to grant Rorty leeway in 
using Whitman et al. to advance his polemic. But when the characterizations 
stray too far from readers' understanding of the originals, sympathy dwindles 
and the polemic collapses. 
Emory University MARK BAUERLEIN 
108 
